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RACE AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX: HAS
A DISPARATE IMPACT CASE BEEN MADE?
RICHARD SCHMALBECK*

I. INTRODUCTION

A.

The Moran and Whitford Argument

Professors Moran and Whitford's A Black Critique of the
Internal Revenue Code1 is a straightforward and plausible application
of "critical race theory" to the United States federal income tax.
Their argument proceeds essentially as follows:
(a) AfricanAmericans differ from the white majority in several important
socioeconomic respects; (b) the U.S. Congress, being dominated by
members chosen from and by the white majorities that prevail in
most states and congressional districts, is likely to write an Internal
Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") 2 with the characteristics of the white
population primarily in mind; from which it (almost) follows that (c)
the I.R.C. in fact produced by the last several dozen Congresses
probably discriminates against African-Americans. The authors'
examination of what they admit is partial evidence on this subject
tends to confirm the hypotheses suggested by the logical chain
described.
I do not question the underlying insights of critical race theory as
Moran and Whitford describe them. Even if it can be assumed that
most members of Congress are well-intentioned and make some
effort to represent the interests of all of their constituents, it seems
likely that the interests of African-Americans-and of every other
* Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1970, J.D. 1975, University of Chicago.
1. Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue
Code, 1996 WiS. L. REv. 751. As will become clear, this Reply is directed primarily at the
Moran and Whitford article cited. I have also read-primarily to avoid unnecessary
duplication of arguments offered there-a draft of Professor Zelenak's critique of the
Wisconsin Law Review article (among others), see Lawrence Zelenak, Taking CriticalTax
Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1521 (1998), as well as drafts of Moran and Whitford's
separate replies.
2. Though many tax writers, including Moran and Whitford, speak loosely of "the
Internal Revenue Code," the discussion in their article and in this Reply relate exclusively
to the personal income tax provisions of the Code.
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minority, for that matter-would be less well-served than the
interests of their majority counterparts. This underrepresentation is
an aspect of democracy that, as a member of the white majority, I
accept as inevitable, but which would no doubt persistently infuriate
me if I were not.
B. My InitialResponse
Be that as it may, the Moran and Whitford argument is not quite
syllogistic, if only because Congress sometimes does things by
accident.
Or, more precisely, Congress sometimes creates
unintended benefits for one group of Americans as a by-product of
acts intended to achieve some other goal that it more consciously
seeks. And it seems to me that that phenomenon is in fact a
reasonably accurate characterization of the federal income tax as it
relates to African-Americans. In fact, when I first read the article,
my mind was headed down a track quite different from the authors',
which I can summarize with the following competing chain of
observations: (a) by far the most salient socioeconomic characteristic
for purposes of assessing income tax burdens is income itself; (b)
African-Americans are dramatically underrepresented in high- and
middle-income groups and overrepresented in the lowest income
groups; (c) our personal income tax, whatever its faults, is in the end
significantly progressive; from which it follows that (d) despite the
details of the tax situations Moran and Whitford analyze, the bottomline arithmetic of tax burdens must surely and substantially favor
African-Americans. 3 One looks in vain for even the barest
acknowledgement of this possibility in their article.

3. Of course, any statement to the effect that any group is favored or disfavored by a
rule or system of rules always raises the normative question: "Compared to what?" I
have no better answer to that than anyone else does, but I mean here to assert that
African-Americans likely bear smaller overall federal income tax burdens than white
taxpayers do, whether measured in absolute terms or as a percentage of their incomes. A
full statistical proof of this assertion is beyond the scope of this Reply. However, to give
the reader some sense of the quantitative aspects of this problem, it can be noted that
fully 55.5% of the total federal income tax paid in 1994 was paid by taxpayers whose
adjusted gross incomes exceeded $75,000 in that year. By contrast, only about 0.5% of
the total tax collected was paid by taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of $10,000 or
less. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX RETURNS 1994, at 31 tbl.1.1 (1997). In 1994, about 15.6% of white
households had money incomes exceeding $75,000, but only 6.8% of black households
were in this category. On the other hand, 26.1% of black households had money incomes
of less than $10,000, while only 11.3% of white households were in this category. See
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1997, at 465 tbl.717 [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABsTRACr].
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C. Horizontal Versus Vertical Equity
I actually think that both lines of analysis are generally correct,
yet they somehow fail to meet head-on in a way that resolves the
apparent paradox. This failure is largely because the two lines are
premised on fundamentally different standards of equity: Moran and
Whitford are for the most part discussing what is generally referred
to as "horizontal equity"-which demands that taxpayers who are
similarly situated, in terms of characteristics that are appropriately
cognizable, be treated similarly by the rules of the tax code. My
armchair response reflected an intuitive sense that any horizontal
inequities in the current income tax system with respect to blackwhite differentials are swamped by much more powerful "vertical
equity" aspects that significantly (albeit accidentally) favor AfricanAmericans. Vertical equity is inevitably somewhat subjective and
does not lend itself to definitional crispness in the way that horizontal
equity does. But vertical equity generally refers to the notion that
the burdens of supporting the government should be apportioned
according to ability to pay, and that those who are relatively well-off,
however that is measured, should bear heavier tax burdens than
those who are not
I note in passing that Moran and Whitford did not make as clear
as they might have that they were engaged exclusively in a horizontal
equity analysis. They do indicate in an early footnote that their
analysis is couched in terms of horizontal equity.' But only a few
pages later, they offer observations that appear to indicate that they
mean to discuss both types of equity.' Moreover, some of the
proposed solutions they offer to the tax rules they find objectionable
have a distinctly vertical equity flavor.7
4. Note that a vertically equitable tax system need not necessarily be a progressive
one. Vertical equity considerations suggest that higher absolute tax burdens should be
assessed on taxpayers with higher incomes (or more wealth, or whatever), but those
considerations do not necessarily dictate that those taxes must represent higher
proportionsof that income (or wealth), which is the usual definitional requirement of a
progressive tax.
5. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 753 n.10.
6. See id. at 756-57 ("[W]e had to decide whether we were interested solely in the
differential impact of tax benefits by race, or whether we were interested in the
differential impact by race after controlling for income .... We decided that we were
interested in both."). The first of these analyses, by not controlling for income, would
necessarily involve a blend of horizontal and vertical equity considerations. The second
would be targeted primarily at horizontal equity issues.
7. For example, they proposed that the current deductions for home mortgage
interest and real property taxes be replaced by credits that are phased out once adjusted

gross income on a joint return exceeds $50,000. See id at 781. But the difference in effect
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Despite occasional confusion on this point, however, it does
seem clear enough that Moran and Whitford are mostly concerned
with horizontal equity, while my initial response was mostly based on
vertical equity considerations. What if both lines of analysis are
indeed well-founded? That is, suppose that it is true that our tax
system contains horizontal equity defects that disadvantage AfricanAmericans, but that the tax system nevertheless treats AfricanAmerican taxpayers more favorably overall than white taxpayers, in
the sense of assessing lower average tax rates on them because of the
lighter burdens assigned generally to lower-income taxpayers. What
should one make of such a system?
In the context of an academic analysis, this is not a difficult
question. Surely African-Americans-like any other taxpayers-are
entitled to a tax system that reasonably satisfies both standards of
equity. From an overall policy perspective, it is entirely appropriate
to say that both forms of equity are essential and that achievement of
one sort of equity is never an adequate substitute for the highest
practicable achievement of the other. To put it more concretely in
terms of this debate, the prevailing sense of vertical equity appears to
reflect the view that low-income taxpayers should hardly be subject
to the income tax at all and that middle-income taxpayers should be
subject only to relatively light taxation. This is a policy that is
presumably not influenced to any significant degree by
considerations of race. If African-Americans turn out to be the
beneficiaries of such a view, it is because they are relatively poor, not
because they are black. It remains true that, to the degree that
between a deduction and a credit is determined by differences in marginal tax rates,
which generally do not exist in horizontal equity analyses, since the comparison in such an
analysis is between taxpayers with equal incomes. Only if one contrasts high-income,
high-tax-rate individuals with lower ones-a quintessentially vertical equity analysisdoes their prescription make any sense.
8. I should note that Moran and Whitford would apparently not concede my point to
the effect that the vertical equity aspects of the federal income tax favor AfricanAmericans. In the same paragraph quoted supra in note 6, they add: "It is commonly
assumed that blacks cluster in the lower economic classes, and that most tax benefits
favor the wealthy more than the poor. If these assumptions are correct, it follows that tax
benefits in the Internal Revenue Code directly benefit whites as a group more than
blacks." Moran & Whitford, supranote 1, at 757. If the argument that "most tax benefits
favor the wealthy" is based on the notion that a particular deduction is worth more to
higher-bracket taxpayers than to lower ones, then it has the absurd quality of making
graduated rates the enemy of the poor. A tax system like our present one, but without
standard deductions, personal exemptions, or graduated rates, would be one in which a
dollar of deduction produced the same benefit for every taxpayer, but it would certainly
not represent an improvement in vertical equity in my view, nor, I expect, in the view of
Moran and Whitford.
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African-Americans do rise above the lower ranks of the economy,
they are entitled to the benefits of horizontally equitable tax laws.
D. The Broader Context of Tax Reform
However, this analysis ignores an important aspect of the current
political context. Moran and Whitford compare the existing I.R.C.
with what might have been drafted by a hypothetical "Black
Congress."9

This comparison is fair enough, and even conveys a

clever didactic point. However, the United States is currently
engaged in a broad discussion of what sort of tax system it should
have going into the next century, and the range of alternatives to the
income tax being seriously considered consists largely of one or
another form of a consumption tax, not the ideal income tax as it
might be envisaged by a black Congress.
The debate that Moran and Whitford have started over the racial
impact of the income tax is important in part because one of the coauthors, Beverly Moran, is one of the two or three most prominent
African-American commentators on tax issues. Her thoughts on the
subject are likely to be influential with other black opinion leaders
and decision-makers. I could easily imagine that black readers of
Moran and Whitford's article might conclude that black support of
the current system is not merely unnecessary, but virtually constitutes
their cooperation in a continuing act of racial oppression. This view
would make enactment of something like a flat tax, or a national
value-added tax, marginally more likely.
How might such an alternative tax affect African-Americans?
Unfavorably, I think. That is so because lower-income households
generally consume a larger proportion of their incomes than higherincome households do, so a shift in the base of our main tax from
income to consumption will generally tend, all else being equal, to
shift burdens toward those lower-income households, including the
disproportionate number of black households falling into that class.
That tendency would likely be exacerbated as to racially disparate
outcomes in the United States, for the very reasons that inform
Moran and Whitford's analysis: Even holding income constant,
blacks have a greater propensity to "save" by investing in consumer
durables, 10 which would likely be treated simply as consumption
under most consumption tax plans. A detailed analysis of how blacks
9. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 758.
10. See id. at 770 (noting that, compared to whites, blacks hold a greater percentage
of their wealth in vehicles).
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would fare under one or more of the heavily promoted consumption
taxes, compared to how they fare under the current income tax,
would have been most welcome. As I noted above, I think such an
analysis would produce the conclusion that the income tax, whatever
its faults, is indeed much friendlier to blacks than anything Congress
is likely to enact in its stead."
But I note all these things mostly as an aside; it is usually unwise
and always unfair to criticize authors for not writing the article that
the critic wishes they had written. It is fair, however, to ask whether
the authors have made the case they chose to make. Is a reader at
least tentatively persuaded by their analysis that the current federal
income tax is horizontally inequitable in its treatment of AfricanAmerican taxpayers? I will discuss this question by looking first at
their choice of the tax rules included in their study, and then at the
substance of their discussion of several of those rules.
II. SELECTION OF RULES TO BE STUDIED

Moran and Whitford recognize the difficulty of proving very
much with the methods they have chosen. 2 The I.R.C. is huge and
messy, and the authors begin their discussion by noting that even
provisions that appear narrowly technical-such as the incomeaveraging rules that were effective from 1964 through 1986-may
have racially disparate consequences. 13 So everything is potentially
11. While this seems likely, it is far from certain. Some proposals that reduce
progressivity at the top end also would increase exemption levels, which might have the
net effect of lowering average tax burdens of African-Americans. For example, the Hall-

Rabushka version of the flat tax would impose a 19% rate on wage income in excess of
$25,500 for a family of four. See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX
at vii (2d ed. 1995). Because Hall and Rabushka propose a number of changes in income
definition and business taxes that would have to be accounted for, comparison with the
present system is difficult. In the present context, repeal of the refundable earned income
credit would have an important effect. However, superficial comparison with the present
rate charts, which would tax the income of a family of four in excess of $17,500 (the sum
of the joint-filer standard deduction, plus four personal exemptions, for the 1997 tax year)
at rates beginning at 15%, would suggest that families with incomes below $30,000 who
now have positive income tax burdens might well have lower direct tax burdens under the
flat tax.
12. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 754.
13. Indeed, the authors say that their study was initiated partly in response to a
question posed rhetorically by a tax professor (who was in fact I) to a black colleague: "Is
there a black view on income averaging?" See id. at 752. Moran and Whitford conclude,
contrary to the assumption of the rhetorical question, that there would be such a view:
that it is not very important to blacks, because they are infrequently found in the higher
brackets. See id. at 752-53. I would note for the record that, at least under the present
rate structure, middle-income taxpayers are in fact quite vulnerable to penalties
associated with income fluctuation, since the rate bracket steps from zero to 15, and from
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relevant, and "everything" covers a lot. They could not consider

literally everything though, and so necessarily made some choices.
How did they select the particular rules they studied? They do not

answer this question directly; they only indicate that the provisions
they studied are "some of the most significant."14 It is clear as well
that the choices were shaped to some degree by the availability of
data.
The magnitude of the data difficulties and the impossibility of

producing a comprehensive analysis of all potentially relevant factors
in assessing the disparate impact of the I.R.C. are easy to appreciate.

Indeed, the very facial neutrality of the I.R.C., which means among
other things that no one-not even the IRS itself-knows the race of

any particular taxpayer, is a large part of the statistical challenge
Moran and Whitford faced in performing their research. That they
managed to develop and implement a reasonable research
methodology of any sort is commendable. Nevertheless, their failure
to specify some sort of rule-selection principles at the outset leaves

them vulnerable to the criticism that they have rigged the study by
choosing features of the I.R.C. that would make their point and

omitting features that might tend in the opposite direction. Any
reader who has even minimal information about the I.R.C. can

readily summon to mind several provisions-such as the earned
income credit, or even the graduated rate structure itself ---which
would appear to favor black taxpayers, but have indeed been omitted
from the study.
15 to 28, are quite steep, and the brackets themselves relatively narrow. As one moves up
the rate structure, the rate steps are smaller and more widely spaced. Thus, middleincome taxpayers experiencing a particular percentage income fluctuation over a multiyear period are more likely to cross bracket boundaries, and hence more likely to be
penalized, than taxpayers in the highest brackets would be for similar percentage
fluctuations. Of course, while this argument suggests that their specific conclusions about
income averaging may have been too hasty, it also tends to reinforce their larger point,
which is that any important tax rule may have some racially disparate effect, even if that
effect is not facially evident.
14. See id. at 800.
15. The earned income credit allows a refundable credit for taxpayers based on the
amount of their earned income. Through income-based phase-out rules, the benefits of
this provision are limited to relatively low-income taxpayers. For the 1998 tax year,
taxpayers with incomes over $30,095 will not generally be eligible for any earned income
credit; lower limits would apply if the taxpayer has fewer than two qualifying children,
and no credit at all may be taken if the taxpayer has more than a modest amount of
investment income ($2300 in 1998), or fails to meet any of a number of other restrictions
on eligibility. See I.R.C. § 32(b)(1), (b)(2) (West Supp. 1998) (setting forth phase-out
parameters which are updated annually pursuant to I.R.C. § 320)); Rev. Proc. 97-57,
1997-52 I.R.B. 20,22 (providing 1998 parameters).
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However, upon further reflection, two reasons emerge to remove
suspicion that the study has been flawed by unprincipled selection of
its subjects. First, many of the omissions that may seem to taint the
study are in fact ambiguous in their impact on the authors'
conclusions, for reasons related to the discussion above regarding
horizontal versus vertical equity considerations. For example, it is far
from clear that the earned income credit particularly favors black
taxpayers when income is held constant,as it of course should be in a
proper assessment of horizontal equity. Black families with adjusted
gross incomes of, say, $20,000, are not eligible for any larger credits
than comparable white families. Indeed, because the credit is based
on earned income (meaning essentially income from labor), it is
entirely possible that higher black unemployment rates would lead to
the conclusion that this provision actually disadvantages blacks as a
group at any given income level, since the sources of their incomes
may be somewhat less likely to qualify them for this credit. Similarly,
any disparate impact analysis of the graduated rate structure is beside
the point if the analysis is confined to horizontal equity, under which
all comparisons are among taxpayers with equal incomes and, hence,
equal tax rates.
Second, it seems likely that Moran and Whitford really did
select, for the most part, tax provisions that have the greatest impact
on tax liability. That assertion is not subject to conclusive proof or
falsification, but it is instructive to compare the list of provisions
examined by Moran and Whitford with the list of "tax
expenditures"-ranked by the revenue loss that each provision was
expected to produce in this fiscal year (Fiscal Year 1998)-prepared
by the Office of Management and Budget in connection with the
submission of the proposed budget last January. 6 By my count,
Moran and Whitford examined nine items that appeared on the tax
expenditure budget.' The Moran and Whitford list included all four
16. See BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT-ANALYTICAL
PERSPECrIVES, FISCAL YEAR 1998, at 79 tbl.5-3 (1997) [hereinafter 1998 BUDGET]
(providing data on "Major Tax Expenditures in the Income Tax, Ranked by Total 1998
Revenue Loss").
17. Those items were the following, with references to the point at which they
appeared in the Moran and Whitford article: the stepped-up basis at death rules of I.R.C.
§ 1014, see Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 760-61; the preferential capital gains rates
provided by I.R.C. § 1(h), see id. at 761-62; the home mortgage interest deduction under
I.R.C. § 163(h), see id. at 774-75; the residential property tax deduction under I.R.C.
§ 164, see id.; the opportunity to roll over capital gains on personal residences in I.R.C.
§ 1034, see id. at 773-74; the opportunity to exclude up to $125,000 of gains on the sale of
a personal residence by a taxpayer over age 55 under I.R.C. § 121, see id.; the exclusion of
health insurance premiums paid by an employer under I.R.C. § 106, see id. at 783-86; the

1998]
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of the largest items on that list, and consisted exclusively of items

drawn from the top twenty revenue-losers.18 Perhaps more to the
deductibility of IRA contributions under I.R.C. § 219, see id. at 755, 783-86; and the
deferral of taxability of pension plan and Keogh plan distributions under I.R.C. § 401, see
id. at 784-86. (Note that several of these provisions were repealed or altered by the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 788. For
example, section 312(a) of the act amended I.R.C. § 121, and section 312(b) of the act
repealed I.R.C. § 1034 generally for sales after May 5, 1997. Also, several sections of the
act, section 302 for example, expanded the availability of the tax-favored individual
retirement accounts, which will doubtless increase the tax expenditures associated with
such accounts. However, the provisions in question were effective for purposes of budget
estimates in January 1997 under substantially the same terms that applied at the time of
the Moran and Whitford study.).
18. The following is the list of "tax expenditures" in the 1998 budget:
Major Tax Expenditures in the Income Tax, Ranked by Total 1998 Revenue Loss
Provision
Exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance
premiums and medical care
Net exclusion of employer pension-plan contributions and
earnings
Deductibility of mortgage interest on owner-occupied
homes
Step-up basis of capital gains at death
Deductibility of nonbusiness State and local taxes other
than on owner-occupied home
Accelerated depreciation of machinery and equipment
(normal tax method)
Deductibility of charitable contributions
Exclusion of OASI benefits for retired workers
Deductibility of State and local property tax on owneroccupied homes
Exclusion of interest on public purpose State and local
debt
Deferral of capital gains on home sales
Deferral on income on life insurance and annuity contracts
Exclusion of interest on State and local debt for various
non-public purposes
Net exclusion of Individual Retirement Account
contributions and earnings
Capital gains (other than agricultural, timber, iron ore, and
coal) (normal tax method)
Earned income credit
Exclusion of workmen's compensation benefits
Exclusion of capital gains on home sales for persons age 55
and over
Graduated corporation income tax rate (normal tax
method)
Accelerated depreciation of buildings other than rental
housing (normal tax method)

Revenue Losses,
in $ millions
1998
1998-2002
75,750
435,745
56,245

285,445

52,115

284,790

31,945
30,995

173,040
169,370

29,285

175,965

22,340
18,495
17,435

123,365
100,345
95,285

15,735

77,245

15,290

81,165
67,975

11,940
8,925

42,450

8,600

45,465

8,480

45,010

5,814
5,305
5,095

31,725
29,590
27,210

4,940

27,165

4,660

13,190
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point, the larger tax expenditure items that they did not examine do
not appear to be ones having obvious horizontal equity features that
would favor African-Americans. 19 For example, the fifth-ranked

item is the deductibility of state and local personal taxes other than
property taxes. 20 This category would consist primarily of state
income taxes, which are assessed according to income, and thus likely
to satisfy horizontal equity concerns reasonably, with no racially
disparate effect running in either direction. 1 Similarly, the next
several items, which involve accelerated depreciation, charitable
contributions, and exclusion of retirement benefits, do not obviously
favor blacks when income is held constant.
Thus, though my own initial reaction on reading the Moran and
Whitford article was that their tentative disparate impact results were
significantly enhanced by conscious or unconscious choices they had
made in constructing the field of study, it seems upon closer scrutiny
that such a suggestion may not be warranted.'
HI. SUBSTANTIVE HORIZONTAL EQUITY ANALYSIS

Moran and Whitford examined rules in four broad categories:
wealth and wealth transfer,23 home ownership,' employee benefits,21
and filing status.26
They found significant horizontal equity
shortcomings in each, uniformly to the disadvantage of AfricanAmericans. In my view, their analysis as to the second and third
categories is generally correct, but serious omissions in their analyses
of the first and fourth categories cast doubt on their conclusions. I
See 1998 BUDGET, supra note 16, at 79 tbl.5-3. Also, though the earned income credit
shows up in rank 16, that is because this table looks only at revenue losses from
uncollected taxes. The earned income credit program also involves direct expenditures
this year of about $22 billion, see id. at 80 n.1, which, together with the revenue foregone,
would make that provision the seventh most expensive tax provision for the current year.
19. Unless, of course, a reader disagrees with my off-hand analysis of the earned
income credit.
20. See 1998 BUDGET, supra note 16, at 79 tbl.5-3; supra note 18 (setting forth
figures).
21. Of course, state income tax rates vary, and so does the percentage of state
population that is black; so there is probably some modest disparate effect. However, I
do not think it would be very large, and I do not even have a clear intuition about which
direction any advantage might run.
22. A possible exception relates to their discussion of the so-called "marriage
penalty," discussed infra in Part III.C. Dealing with this aspect of filing status without
consideration of the broader questions in this area seems to me an inappropriate choice.
23. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 759-72.
24. See id. at 773-83.
25. See id. at 783-91.
26. See id. at 791-99.
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will discuss each of these categories briefly below.
A.

Wealth and Wealth Transfer
Moran and Whitford analyzed four features of the tax treatment
of wealth and wealth transfers in this first and longest section of
detailed analysis: that the receipt of property by gift or inheritance in
the first instance is not a taxable event under the federal income tax;27
that accrued gains are not taxed until realized;z2 that such gains may
never be taxed if the holder of the property dies without having
realized those gains;29 and that even if the gains are realized, they
may be taxed at more favorable rates than apply to other forms of
income.30 Their argument is, basically, that African-Americans are,
at any given income level, less likely to receive property by gift or
inheritance and less likely to have investments of a sort that generate
appreciation in value that can benefit from the favorable rules on
realization and capital gain.3
1. Exclusion of Gifts and Inheritances
Accepting their evidence on the racially disparate receipt of
property by gift or inheritance, deep conceptual problems remain in
their assumption that these things are appropriate for inclusion in
income. Taxing the receipt of gifts or inheritances without allowing a
deduction to the donor or decedent raises a double-counting problem
of serious proportions. If receipt of a gift yields an "accession to
wealth, clearly realized" under the Glenshaw Glass income
definition32 that Moran and Whitford use, then it is equally clear that
a decrement to the wealth of the donor simultaneously occurs. The
tax rules could be amended both to require inclusion by the donee
and to allow a deduction by the donor of gifts, but since most large
gifts are thought to proceed from higher-bracket taxpayers to lowerbracket taxpayers, this amendment would reduce aggregate tax
revenue and presumably exacerbate any racially disparate effects of
this part of the tax system.
A superficially similar double-counting may be thought to take
place when, for example, A pays B for the latter's service to A as a
27. See i& at 762-63.

28. See id. at 759-60.
29. See id. at 760-61.
30. See id. at 761-62.
31. See id. at 768-72.

32. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955); Moran &
Whitford, supra note 1, at 753 (citing Glenshaw Glass and its definition of income).
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butler. A gets no deduction, and B clearly has income. In that case,
however, the payment represents consumption by A of butler
services. Since the comprehensive tax base approach to income
accounting defines income as the sum of wealth changes and
consumption within a time period, it can be seen that consuming
services and paying for them are transactions that cancel, leaving
income unchanged and providing no basis for a deduction by A.
It has been argued that if A makes a gift to B, A also could be
said to have consumed that amount.3 Gift giving has always seemed
to me an odd form of consumption, however. It uses no resources,
and failure to make the gift in question would free no resources for
alternative uses-unlike failing to hire B as a butler, which would
free B to sell his labor elsewhere.
My argument on this point can perhaps be best summarized by
asking if A and B are, taken together, any better off when A makes a
gift to B. They probably are better off in a psychological sense: B is
gratified to receive the gift, and A must take pleasure in benefiting B,
or the gift would not have been made. However, psychic benefits are
not usually accounted for by tax rules; A and B might also be better
off if they kissed or embraced, but that is not something with which
we want the tax system to deal. In purely economic terms, the gift
has not improved their situation; taken together, B's increased
consumption opportunities are precisely offset by A's decreased
consumption opportunities. In that view, gifts are a mere transfer of
consumption opportunities, not consumption in itself.
Finally, I would note that gifts contribute nothing to the gross
domestic product and national income accounts. Nor are the
exclusions of gifts counted as part of the tax expenditure budget.
As indicated in the notes to the foregoing, this view of gifts is not
universal. 4 Moran and Whitford can certainly find support for their
view that gifts should be included in income, with or without a
deduction for the donor. But since there is no widely shared
33. Indeed, Henry Simons makes such an argument in his 1938 treatise Personal
Income Taxation, which is, of course, the fountainhead of the comprehensive tax base
idea. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 139-40 (1938).
34. Simons, referenced supra in note 33, would presumably endorse Moran and
Whitford's approach. Others are generally more equivocal, with some indicating that
income taxation of gifts may be a good idea, but only as a substitute for wealth transfer
taxes. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts
and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978). The purpose of wealth transfer
taxes, of course, is to reduce economic inequality, an idea that concerns exclusively
vertical equity and has no relevance to horizontal equity concerns of the sort discussed by
Moran and Whitford.
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agreement that gifts should be included in income, there can be no
agreement that the failure to do so constitutes an equitable

shortcoming of any kind.
2. Other Capital Taxation Rules
Moran and Whitford's other arguments regarding treatment of
returns from capital investment enjoy much broader support from
the tax policy literature. No tax expert would defend the exclusion of
capital gains at death, nor the realization requirement, 35 on any
grounds other than the administrative inconvenience of rules to the
contrary.

Capital gains rate preferences are similarly unpopular

among tax policy experts.36
Even this solid ground gives way a bit, however, when Moran
and Whitford conclude that black taxpayers are disadvantaged by
their tendency to invest in inner-city housing and consumer durables,
rather than in assets with significant appreciation potential, like stock
and commercial real estate.37 For while the tax system does indeed
lightly tax the latter categories of assets, it fails to tax at all the
returns on investments in consumer durables. Suppose, for example,
that a taxpayer with $20,000 is deciding whether to buy an

automobile or to lease the automobile and buy a financial asset with
the $20,000.

If he buys the automobile, he will be spared the

(nondeductible) cost of leasing the automobile, an amount which
represents the gross return on his investment in that asset.38 He
might be able to defer or even to avoid taxation on the returns on the
35. Moran and Whitford's choice of Glenshaw Glass as their baseline definition of
income seems especially odd in light of their criticism of the realization requirement,
which the Supreme Court in that case seemed to accept without pause when it spoke of
"accessions to wealth, clearly realized." Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431 (emphasis
added). Nevertheless, most other descriptions of the comprehensive tax base recognize
the failure to tax gains as they accrue as a major shortcoming.
36. So-called "supply-side" economists defend preferential capital gains rates on
grounds of their supposed stimulative effects, but not because of the conceptual
soundness of such lowered rates. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LINDSAY, THE GRowTH
EXPERIMENT 46, 229 (1990). I have argued elsewhere that lower capital gains rates might
be justified on grounds that the distortions induced by such rates offset distortions
induced by the realization requirement itself. See Richard L. Schmalbeck, The Uneasy
Case for a Lower Capital Gains Tax: Why Not the Second Best?, 48 TAx NOTES 195
(1990).
37. See Moran & Whitford, supranote 1, at 769-71.
38. His net return would be that amount, less a reasonable allowance for depreciation
of the asset. The lease payments would ordinarily be expected to equal this depreciation
allowance, plus the lender's cost of the capital it invested in the car. Thus, the net
investment returns to a consumer who buys a car should approximate the general rate of
return on invested capital in the economy at the time of the purchase.
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financial asset he might buy, but he will definitely and automatically
avoid taxation on any return on the investment in the consumer
durable.
Although I regard the foregoing as serious shortcomings in
Moran and Whitford's arguments, I must concede the larger point
that they make as to this category of tax rules: The federal income
tax-as written and as enforced-39 -contains serious defects in
taxation of income from capital, most of which result in the
undertaxation of such income.40 Moran and Whitford make a
convincing case that, as a whole, at any given income level, AfricanAmericans have less capital than white taxpayers4 ' and hence enjoy
lesser benefits from the lighter tax burdens on income from that
source. In other words, one of their substantial points continues to
carry weight even if they were to concede that I was correct in
challenging their analysis of the exclusion of gifts and inheritances
and of the disparate impact of the tax rules regarding financial assets
and consumer durables.
B. Home Ownership and Employee Benefits
I consider the two major categories of home ownership and
employee benefits together because my commentary on them is
similar and brief. Although a few quibbles can be raised here and
there, Moran and Whitford have generally made their points as to the
tax rules in these categories. Congress has intentionally departed
from accepted definitions of income in order to encourage home
ownership, pension savings, and health insurance. Both Congress's
motives and its effects in these areas are mostly benign, but, at least
as to the first two of this list, an incidental effect appears to have
been that, at any given income level, African-Americans have
enjoyed disproportionately lesser benefits.42
What exactly should be done about this effect perplexes me, as it
clearly did Moran and Whitford themselves. The ends Congress has
39. I refer here to the fact that income from wages is generally easy to find, and
hence to tax, while income from capital can be more elusive. Such income can consist of,
to cite one example, interest on a foreign bank account that is beyond the discovery of the
U.S. tax authorities. Thus, to the defects in the formal structure of the taxation of capital
must be added some very difficult enforcement problems relating to the same income.
40. There are at least a few exceptions to this generalization, however. Failure to
index the basis of assets, and the existence of a separate, unintegrated corporate income
tax are examples of features that tend in the direction of overtaxing income from capital.
41. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 763-72.
42. Note that Moran and Whitford did not find that employer-provided health
insurance raised horizontal equity concerns. See id. at 787.
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sought through the provisions in these categories generally are

laudable. One wishes black taxpayers were in a position to take
better advantage of those provisions, but that is not to say that even a

black Congress would prefer an income tax that provided no
incentives for home purchases or employer funding of pensions.

Accordingly, Moran and Whitford's recommendations in these areas
are modest and not wholly in keeping with their general emphasis on
horizontal equity improvements.43

Perhaps they should have

explored more radical approaches to these problems, such as
legislation that would employ means outside the tax system to
expand home ownership and pensions. 44 But this assertion is meant
more as a suggestion for future consideration than as a criticism of
their article as written.
C. Filing Status

The final subject of Moran and Whitford's analysis is the socalled marriage penalty.45

As is generally understood, under the

current income tax rate structure, the rates applying to married
couples filing joint returns are more favorable-compared to the
rates that would have applied had the parties been able to file as

single taxpayers-if one partner's income is very much larger than
the other's. The rates are less favorable, however, than single returns
would have been if the partners have roughly similar incomes.46
43. As to home ownership, they argue for the use of credits with income caps. See
supra note 7 (discussing this argument). As to employee benefits, they generally do not
advocate changes, except for the suggestion that provisions authorizing 401(k) plans be
repealed. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 790.
44. Recall that Stanley Surrey argued years ago that Congress ought generally to
eschew use of the tax rules to provide incentives for taxpayers to behave in particular
ways, even if the behavior was generally desirable. Although he was not describing blackwhite horizontal inequities, he did note the "windfalls" and "unfairness" that usually
characterize the results of efforts to provide such incentives. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct
Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 734 (1970). In a following article,
Professor Surrey specifically criticized the tax expenditures implicit in the rules regarding
home ownership, suggesting that if they were to be replaced by direct appropriations,
those appropriations would take a very different form from the subsidy embodied in the
I.R.C. See Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches
Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Government Assistance, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 352,395-408 (1970).
45. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 791-99.
46. Note that married couples can file separate returns. However, those separate
returns are not taxed under the rate schedules prescribed for single taxpayers, but rather
under a special-and quite unfavorable-schedule called "married, filing separately." In
recent years, only about two percent of married taxpayers have filed separate returns, and
many of those presumably have done so because their marriage has deteriorated to a
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Moran and Whitford reviewed data on income distributions within
families and concluded that black married couples were more likely
than white couples to have roughly equal incomes, and hence to
suffer more and larger marriage penalties. 47
Of course, one should remember in thinking about this issue that
Congress did not enact marriage penalties and marriage bonuses per
se. What Congress did enact is a system under which married
taxpayers are taxed according to their total income, regardless of the
similarity of, or disparity between, the two spouses' incomes.
Suppose, for example, that A, a high-bracket taxpayer, marries B, an
individual with no income. When A and B file a joint return, they
will enjoy a lower tax bill than A would have paid on that income if
she had remained single (that is, they will enjoy a marriage bonus).
But the lower tax does no more than reflect congressional judgments
about A's reduced economic circumstances and similarly reduced
ability to pay tax. Two cannot in fact live as cheaply as one, so A's
income will not go as far as it did when A was supporting only
herself. The so-called marriage bonus, in other words, reflects a
changed economic reality.
Conversely, suppose that C, a middle-bracket taxpayer, marries
D, an individual with the same income. Their total tax as a married
couple will likely exceed the sum of the tax bills they would have paid
as single taxpayers (that is, they will suffer a marriage penalty).
Again, however, the higher tax reflects an economic reality: Two
cannot live as cheaply as one, but there are likely to be some
efficiencies in forming a single household, such as preparing meals
together, and so on.' s It is thus not at all clear that there is any
point at which sharing financial data to complete a joint return has become problematic.
In 1994, about 97 million married taxpayers filed joint returns, while fewer than 2.5
million filed separate returns. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 1994, at 36-37 tbl.1.3 (1997) (providing
figures on which author's calculations are based).
47. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 797. They note that in 1980, the average
black wife contributed 29.5% of her family's income, while the average white wife earned
only 18% of her family's total. See id. Both of these numbers are by now rather out of
date, given the changes in the amount and type of labor force participation by women in
the last 18 years. One thinks, to mention one example, of the much larger number of twolawyer couples now in the labor force and now suffering marriage penalties, compared to
what would have been the case in 1980.
48. The economies should not be exaggerated. They will vary widely and will not
always be large. On the other hand, the marriage penalty is not large either. For
example, in 1997, a couple with incomes of $25,000 each would pay only $356 more tax as
filers of a joint return than they would have paid as two single taxpayers. Thus, if they
can save as little as $30 per month by reason of merging their households, they will not
suffer at the hands of the marriage penalty on a net basis.
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inequity in this statutory construct. Any two married couples with
the same taxable income face the same tax rates, regardless of their
race, and regardless of the mix of their incomes. Since it does not
seem that either of these factors should bear on tax liabilities, one is
hardly disturbed to learn that they in fact do not. To make the case
that blacks are disadvantaged by this arrangement, one must assert
that a married couple whose partners have roughly similar incomes is
entitled to a lower tax bill than an otherwise identical married couple
with a wider income split between them.
I question as well Moran and Whitford's decision to look at just
one aspect of filing status, rather than looking at filing status
questions more generally.
If it is true, for example, that a
disproportionate number of married African-Americans suffer
marriage penalties, then it is probably also true that blacks as a group
benefit from the fact that overall marriage rates are lower for blacks
than for whites.4 9 It may be worth noting as well that the ultimate
antidote to an impending marriage penalty is to follow Nancy
Reagan's advice (offered in a different context) to "just say 'no'" to
a marriage proposal, but to go ahead and live together anyway. Data
from the 1990 census suggest that this option is significantly more
popular among African-Americans than among
whites, and that too
50
is presumably to the tax advantage of blacks.
Finally, some consideration might be given to the last set of tax
rates applicable to individuals-those applying to "heads of
households," a status available essentially to single parents. The tax
rates applying to such taxpayers are distinctly lower (at all incomes
below $250,000) than the rates that would otherwise apply to single
taxpayers. Again, 1990 census data suggest that a far higher
proportion of African-Americans than of whites is eligible for head-

49. Sample data for 1996 suggest that about 56.7% of whites were living with their
spouses, while only 31.0% of blacks were. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at
58 tbl.64 (providing data on "Living Arrangements of Persons 15 Years Old and Over, by
Selected Characteristics, 1996"). Living arrangements are a better measure for tax
purposes than is actual marital status, since legally separated spouses are eligible to file as
single taxpayers, and certain married individuals supporting dependents can file as heads
of households if they are "considered unmarried," one of the qualifications for which is
the substantial absence of the spouse.
50. About 10.2% of nonfamily households headed by white persons consisted of an
unmarried man and woman living together. The comparable percentage for black
households was 15.5%, a rate that is about 53% greater than the comparable rate for
white households. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION,
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, at 51-52 tbls.51-52 (providing figures upon
which author's calculations are based).
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of-household status.5 '
Taken together, the facts that there are proportionately more
African-Americans who are single parents, or single persons living
with adults of the opposite sex, and more single persons overall,
make it unlikely that blacks as a group are disadvantaged by the
current filing status rules. This would be true even if one does think
that the "marriage penalty" is a real equity problem, and not just a
rallying cry of married couples who would like not to have their
improved economic status (as married couples, enjoying the
efficiencies associated with that status) reflected in their tax bills.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

As I noted at the outset, I first read Moran and Whitford's
article skeptically. The federal income tax is certainly facially raceneutral. And the tax is progressive, which must greatly favor
African-Americans in light of their significantly lower average
incomes. I continue to believe that those things are true, and that the
progressivity of the tax system is a far more important characteristic
from an African-American viewpoint than are any of the
characteristics Moran and Whitford consider in their article.
Nevertheless, I must admit that I am tentatively persuaded that there
really may be important features of the federal income tax that raise
horizontal equity concerns along racial lines, which is, of course,
Moran and Whitford's main point.
What can be done about those features is extremely problematic.
They are primarily features having to do with home ownership and
retirement savings-features that enjoy very broad support within
Congress and among taxpayers of all races.52 It is difficult to imagine
mustering political support for radical changes of these features
within the context of a continued income tax regime. Moreover, it is
51. According to the Census, 12.2% of family households headed by whites consisted
of households headed by females, with no husband present. See id. (providing figures for
author's calculations). The comparable figure for black family households was 43.2%, a
figure that is more than three and one-half times larger than the comparable white rate.
See icL (providing figures for author's calculations).
52. These features are codified at I.R.C. § 163 (mortgage interest), § 164 (real
property taxes), and §§ 401-417 (qualified plans). As noted above, see supra notes 39-40
and accompanying text, it is also probably the case that the tax system has a disparate
impact unfavorable to blacks in its failure to tax income from capital as reliably as income
from wages. The solutions in these areas, however, are far from obvious, since the defects
stem largely from administrative considerations (such as the difficulty of annually
appraising assets) or enforcement shortcomings (such as the difficulty of discovering
foreign bank accounts).
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not even clear that radical reform would be desirable, since these
features accomplish non-tax goals that are generally regarded with
high approbation.
Reform of these features might be imaginable within the context
of a more general radical reform of the federal tax system-one that
might include repeal of the existing income tax altogether. But it
seems very likely that such a reform would involve a substitute tax
that would be significantly less progressive than the current income
tax, and this result would likely be much more powerfully
disadvantageous to blacks than are the horizontal equity problems
that may affect the current system.
Whether or not there is a good solution to this problem, Moran
and Whitford deserve credit for raising a significant issue and for
doing the difficult data analysis necessary to show, at least
tentatively, that the federal income tax may well be infected by
heretofore
racially
tinged
horizontal
equity
problems
unacknowledged.

